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RELEASED TIME AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: A REPLY
Leo Pfeffer*

his generous article-review of this writer's book, Church, State,
and Freedom, Paul G. Kauper justified the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Zorach v. Clauson2 on the basis of its prior
decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 3 In the Pierce case, it will be
remembered, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon statute whose
purpose it was to require attendance of all children at public schools.
In Zorach v. Clauson, the Court upheld the validity of a New York
statute that permitted public schools to release children for one hour
weekly to receive religious education in church schools off public
school premises.4 Professor Kauper argues that"... if release from all
classes in the public schools is constitutionally required in order to
protect the freedom of parents who wish to send their children to
parochial schools, why does release for one hour per week from public
school instruction in order to provide opportunity for religious education
assume such extraordinary proportions as a form of coercion as to require its invalidation in the name of separation of church and state?"5
This argument was presented by counsel for the appellees in the
Zorach case. Although not adopted by the Supreme Court, it has won
favor in the New York Court of Appeals6 and with a number of commentators besides Professor Kauper. A writer in the Harvard Law
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"Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 MICH. L. R:Bv. 829 (1954).
2 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
s 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925).
4 In McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948), the Court
held unconstitutional a released time program in Champaign, Illinois, whereunder the
religious instruction was conducted within the public school building with substantial
cooperation and supervision by public school authorities. Professor Kauper states that "All
students of this subject may well agree that Zorach for all practical purposes overruled
McCollum." Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review,'' 52 MicH. L. R:Bv. 829
at 839 (1954). But the Court in Zorach distinguished McCollum on the ground that in
the New York case "the public schools do no more than accommodate their schedules to a
program of outside religious instruction." 343 U.S. 306 at 315, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). The
Court expressly stated: "We follow the McCollum case. But we cannot expand it to cover
the present released time program. • • ." Ibid.
5 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review,'' 52 MICH. L. R:Bv. 829 at 841
(1954).
6Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161 at 173-174, 100 N.E. (2d) 463 (1951): ''Moreover, parents have the right to educate their children elsewhere than in the public schools,
provided the State's minimum requirements are met (Education Law, §3204; Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, supra), and thus, if they wish, choose a religious or parochial school
where religious instruction is freely given. That being so, it follows that parents, who
desire to have their children educated in the public schools but to withdraw them therefrom
for the limited period of only one hour a week in order to receive religious instruction,
may ask the public school for such permission, and the school may constitutionally accede
to this parental request. •.•"
1 Kauper,
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Review, for example, asserts, "Since a state must release children completely from their obligation to attend public schools if they desire to
attend religious schools [citing the Pierce case] it is at least arguable
that it should be constitutionally permissible for the state to release
them for one hour a week for the same purpose...." 7
This may be called the Euclidean argument: the whole is greater
than any of its parts and if a full school week of religious instruction
can constitutionally pass through or over the wall of separation, a
fortiori, one school hour can. It assumes another premise suggested by
Professor Kauper8 and accepted by many commentators9 that the
separation or "establishment" clause in the First Amendment:1° is not
an absolute but merely a means to an end-the "free exercise" guaranty.
When, as in a released time situation, effectuation of the separation
principle would hinder rather than promote free exercise, the former
must yield to the latter.11
If the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is, Supreme
Court decisions are what constitutional writers say they are. The
Pierce case is treated by writers as an important decision in the constitutional law of religious liberty1 2 and, viewed in the light of later citations of it by the Supreme Court,13 this is today a reasonable treatment
of the decision. But when the Pierce case was decided, the liberty
involved was not religious liberty at all. The issue was not whether the
state could force upon a child a secular education offensive to his
parents' religious convictions, but rather whether the state could constitutionally arrogate to itself a monopoly in furnishing secular education. "No question," said the Court, "is raised concerning the power
of the State . . . to require that all children of proper age attend some
school ... [or] that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship
7 "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term," 66 HARv. L. RBv. 89 at 119 (1952).
8 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 MICH. L. R.Bv. 829 at 841,

844 (1954).
9 E.g., Katz, "Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality," 20 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 426
at 428 (1953); Murray, "Law or Prepossessions?" 14 I.Aw & CoNTEM. PnoB. 23 at 32
(1949); CORWIN, A CoNSTITtlnON OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 114 (1951).
10 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."
11 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 MxcH. L. R.Bv. 829 at 841

(1954).
12 Professor Howe, for example, includes it in his CASES ON CmmcH AND STATE IN
THE UNITI!D STATES (1952). It is also included in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS ON FREEDOM
IN RELIGION (1949). See also PFEFFER, CmmCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 513 (1953);
Fahy, ''Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court," 14 I.Aw & CoNTEM. PnoB. 73 at

74-76 (1949).
18 E.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152, n. 4, 58 S.Ct.
778 (1938); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. l at 32-33, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947)
(dissent).
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must be taught. . . ."14 And in Everson v. Board of Education, the
Court upheld expenditure of public funds to transport children to parochial schools because the state recognized that such schools supplied
the children with the same secular education that the state was empowered to supply in its schools.1 5
The year before the Zorach case was decided, the Supreme Court
found lacking of sufficient merit to warrant argument, a contention
that, to borrow the language of the Harvard Law Review writer,16 "a
state must release children completely from their obligation to attend
public schools if they desire to attend religious schools ...."17 But the
conclusive evidence that the Pierce case was not based on religious
liberty lies in the identity of the appellants. What is commonly referred to as the Pierce case involved two separate cases18 concerning
two separate plaintiffs and two separate schools. One was the Catholic
parochial school conducted by the Society of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary. The other school was the Hill Military
Academy in which, as far as the record shows, not even a Lord's Prayer
was recited. Since a single opinion was written in both cases and no
distinction was made in the opinion in respect to the two schools, it is
clear that the liberty vindicated by the Supreme Court was not religious
liberty.19
14 268 U.S. 510 at 534, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925).
15 330 U.S. 1 at 18, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947): "This Court has said that parents may, in
the discharge of their duty under state compulsory education laws, send their children to a
religious rather than a public school if the school meets the secular educational requirements
which the state has power to impose. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. It
appears that these parochial schools meet New Jersey's requirements."
16 "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term," 66 HARv. L. RBv. 89 at 119 (1952).
17Donner v. New York, 342 U.S. 884, 72 S.Ct. 178 (1951), dismissing for want of
a substantial federal question, People v. Donner, 199 N.Y. Misc. 643, affd. 278 App. Div.
705, affd. 302 N.Y. 857. The New York courts upheld a conviction under the state's compulsory school attendance law of extremely Orthodox Jewish parents who insisted that their
religious convictions precluded participation in secular education and who accordingly sent
their children to an all-day school where only religion was studied.
18 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Pierce v. Hill Military Academy.
19 A similar fate was experienced by West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943), which is generally treated as a religious liberty
decision [See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 at 165-166, 64 S.Ct. 438
(1944)], although Justice Jackson took pains to point out that the issue was not whether
Jehovah's Witnesses had a constitutional right to be exempted from the requirement of
saluting the flag because their religious convictions forbade their participation in the ceremony, but whether the state could make the flag salute compulsory as to anyone. The issue,
Justice Jackson said, was one of freedom of speech (which includes freedom to remain
silent), not freedom of religion. The fact that the objectants were religiously motivated
was immaterial, and the result would have been the same if the objectants had been atheists
or agnostics. So, too, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358 (1905), is
treated as a religious liberty case (e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 at 166, n.
12), even though no assertion was made in that case that the compulsory vaccination law
violated any religious convictions of the defendant, and the question of religion does not
appear anywhere in the Court's decision upholding the statute against the claim that it
violated the due process clause.
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This discussion of the Pierce case shows the fallacy of the Eucliclean
argument. The axiom that the whole is greater than any of its parts
assumes that a particular part measured against the whole is part of
that whole and not another whole. The whole in Pierce was twentyfive hours of secular education; the part in Zorach was one hour of
religious education. If in the Pierce case only Hill Military Academy
had appealed to the Supreme Court, the decision and opinion would
have been the same; yet it would be difficult to argue that because a
child had a right to be released twenty-five hours weekly for education ·
at that institution, a release of one hour weekly for religious education
was not constitutionally vulnerable.
Professor Kauper is aware that the holding of the Pierce case is not
completely applicable to the Zorach situation. He concedes that public
school boards are not "under a constitutional compulsion to enter into
released time arrangements." But the Pierce case left no discretion to
school boards; it ruled that they were under a compulsion to allow
children to attend parochial and other non-public schools.20
Professor Kauper asserts that "It is not merely fanciful or frivolous
to suggest that the parochial school system represents one hundred percent released time."21 But this assertion is negated by the presence of
the Hill Military Academy in the Pierce case. It is negated by the
Everson case.22 It is negated by the Court's dismissal of the appeal in
Donner v. New York. 23 And it is negated by Professor Kauper's disclaimer of any intent to assert that "school boards are under a constitutional compulsion to enter into released time arrangements." It requires
little imagination to contemplate the effects upon public school administration if the Pierce doctrine were held applicable to all requests for
time off for religious education from one to twenty-five hours weekly.
Another religious liberty argument is suggested by Professor Kauper
in support of the Zorach decision. "The author contends [says Professor
Kauper] and rightly so, that public schools should be allowed to release
children on certain days in order to attend special religious services of
their faiths. This practice he defends on the grounds of religious lib20 For a similar criticism of the Court's assertion in the Everson case that it did "not
mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation only to children attending
public schools .•••" [330 U.S. l at 16, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947)], see PFEFFER, CmmCH,
STATE, AND FREEDOM 477-478 (1953).
21 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 M:rca. L. REv~ 829 at 841
(1954).
22 Justice Jackson's dissent in the Everson case was based on his contention that all
the education received in Catholic parochial schools was religious. But this contention was
rejected by the majority of the Court which held that the purpose of the assailed expenditure of public funds was to "facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education.••." 330 U.S. l at 7, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
.
23 Supra note 16.
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erty and he states a good case. But is this not another instance of release
time but on a smaller scale?"24
This argument too was presented by counsel for the appellees in
the Zorach case; but, unlike the Pierce argument, it achieved some
acceptance by the Court which said:
"... A Catholic student applies to his teacher for permission to
leave the school during hours on a Holy Day of Obligation to
attend a mass. A Jewish student asks his teacher for permission
to be excused for Yorn Kippur. A Protestant wants the afternoon
off for a family baptismal ceremony. In each case the teacher
requires parental consent in writing. In each case the teacher, in
order to make sure the student is not a truant, goes further and
requires a report from the priest, the rabbi, or the minister. The
teacher in other words cooperates in a religious program to the
extent of making it possible for her students to participate in it.
Whether she does it occasionally for a few students, regularly for
one, or pursuant to a systematized program designed to further the
religious needs of all the students does not alter the character of
the act."25
This ''Yorn Kippur" argument too has a Euclidean base in the axiom
that things equal to the same or equal things are equal to each other.
It might be put in terms of an algebraic equation something like this
(''YK" representing Yorn Kippur absence, "RT" released time, and "C"
constitutional):

YK=C
RT=YK
.·.RT=C
The fallacy of this reasoning may be shown, as in the other Euclidean argument, by applying the converse of the second Euclidean
axiom: things equal to unqual things are unequal to each other. The
"C" in the first equation means constitutionally required; the "C" in
the third equation means constitutionally permitted and not (Professor
Kauper agrees) constitutionally required. Thus testing the equation,
we find:
24 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 M:rCH. L. REv. 829 at 840
(1954).
2 5Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 at 313, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952). The New York
Court of Appeals expressed the argument thus: " ••• Excuses from attendance are permitted
for many good reasons; among others, children are excused from school on holy days set
apart by their respective faiths .••. Indeed we are all agreed that refusal to excuse children
for that reason would be an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of religion. H it be
constitutional to excuse children of a particular faith for entire days for such a religious
purpose, it seems clear, by a parity of reasoning, that it is also constitutional, under the
circumstances here presented, to excuse children of whatever faith one hour a week for
another and similar religious purpose••••" 303 N.Y. 161 at 173, 100 N.E. (2d) 463 (1951).
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YK=C1
RT=C2
C1 ±C2
.·.YK ± RT
A Jewish child has a constitutional right to be excused from attending school on Yorn Kippur because it would violate his religious convictions to attend_ school on that day and his absence presents no threat
to a higher societal interest sufficiently immediate and grave to justify
impairment of the free exercise of his religion. 26 No one, as far as this
writer knows, has ever contended that it would violate the religious
convictions of anyone to partake of religious education on Wednesdays
between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon after the close of school rather
than from 2 to 3 before school closes. If the Jewish religion permitted
its adherents to observe Yam Kippur on Sunday or weekdays at their
election, it is far from certain that Jewish children would have a constitutional right to be excused from public school on a weekday to
observe Yorn Kippur. The obligations of the state and the religious
group are equal and reciprocal. If the former is obligated to achieve
its purposes by means which do not infringe upon the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment if such alternative means are available
and practicable,27 there would seem to be a reciprocal duty on the part
of the individual to satisfy his religious requirements without infringing
upon the state's functions if that is practicable.
There is, this writer believes, a religious liberty claim in the released
time program and in the Zorach case. It is a claim which is consistent
with rather than opposed to the separation claim. In the appellants'
brief to the Supreme Court in the Zorach case, this writer contended
that the released time program violated the free exercise no less than
the establishment guaranty of the First Amendment. The contention
was based on the argument that the state's compulsory school attendance laws operated to coerce children into participating in released time
classes. Even if, as is sometimes suggested, the free exercise clause
protects only the religious, 28 practical considerations frequently make
26 Donner v. New York, 342 U.S. 884, 72 S.Ct. 178 (1951), makes it clear that
religious convictions would not constitutionally require excused absences for 365 Yom Kippurs
annually. Indeed, 52 Yom Kippurs a year may be too much. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bey,
166 Pa. Super. 136 (1950), where the court overruled a Moslem parent's plea of religious
liberty in a prosecution under the compulsory school attendance law for keeping his child
away from school every Friday.
27 Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct 308 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct 312
(1951).
28See, e.g., PARSONS, THE FmsT FRilllDOM 79 (1948): "As for those who profess no
religion, or who repudiate religion, it is difficult to conceive how they can appeal to the
First Amendment, since this document was solely concerned with religion itself, not its
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it impossible to provide released time instruction for children adhering
to minority denominations,29 with the result that these children are
faced with the alternative of continued confinement in public school
(pursuant to the compulsory school attendance law) or participation in
instruction in a faith not their own.30
This argument was disposed of by Justice Douglas for the majority
of the Court in the Zorach case with a summary, "It takes obtuse reasoning to inject any issue of the 'free exercise' of religion into the present
case."31 Professor Kauper is more charitable, but likewise rejects the
argument. To him the fact that "the overwhelming majority of children
continue to choose secular instruction .•. hardly supports the compulsion theory." 32 (Professor Kauper's argument is somewhat reminiscent
of the suggestion by Arthur Krock of the New York Times that even
if Senator McCarthy's investigations of James Wechsler, editor of the
New York Post, was motivated by a desire to intimidate him and thus
affect the paper's editorial policy, it did not constitute an infringement
of the First Amendment's guaranty of the freedom of the press because
in fact Wechsler was not intimidated.)
It is true that released time religious instruction has proved largely
ineffective to attract public school children. 88 But the fact that most
children find continued secular instruction less distasteful than religious
instruction, while possibly a reflection upon religious pedagogical methods as compared with modern public school education, does not establish the absence of a restraint upon liberty nor remove the unconstitutional taint. Constitutionally proscribed conduct does not become permissible because it is inefficacious.
The writer has come across instances of criminal court judges suspending prisoners' sentences and warning the prisoners that the susdenial. By its very nature, as regards what it says about religion, they are outside its ken."
See also statement in Gordon v. Board 0£ Education, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 464, 178 P. (2d)
488 (1947), quoted in Zorach v. Clauson, 198 N.Y. Misc. 631 (1950), to the effect that
the purpose 0£ the amendment is to protect "freedom of religion, not freedom from
religion."
29 In the McCollum case, for example, there were no released time classes acceptable
either to Lutherans or Jehovah's Witnesses, nor, except briefly when the program was
launched, to Jewish children. See Transcript 0£ Record in McCollum v. Board 0£ Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
so PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 304 (1953).
s1 343 U.S. 306 at 311, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
S 2 Kauper, "Church, State, and Freedom: A Review," 52 MicH. L. REv. 829 at 840
(1954).
33 In McCollum, Justice Frankfurter quoted an estimate that 2,000,000 children participated in released time programs. 333 U.S. 203 at 224-225, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948). This
writer considers the estimate more than generous. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FrumDOM 319-320 (1953). The 1950 Statistical Abstract 0£ the United States estimated that
in 1947 there were 23,659,158 pupils enrolled in the nation's public schools.
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pension would be revoked if they did not attend church services regularly every Sunday. Can it be fairly said that church attendance under
these circumstances is truly voluntary?
The element of constraint in the released time program can be
brought into sharper focus by viewing the compulsory school attendance and the released laws as parts of a single statute. Present law
( either expressly or by regulation or practice) requires children to attend
public school, let us say, twenty-five hours weekly. A separate law
permits children attending religious instruction to be excused for one
of those hours. Suppose, however, the law required children to attend
public school twenty-four hours weekly, except that children who do
not participate in religious instruction are required to attend public
school an additional and independent hour weekly, absence wherefrom
subjects the child's parents to criminal prosecution. Would not attendance at religious instruction be compulsive, and would the fact that
nine out of ten children choose the extra hour of public school make it
any less compulsive?
The promoters of released time religious instruction are under no
illusions. They recognize that even the small measure of success attained by the program would be gravely threatened if the element of
constraint were eliminated. It is for that reason that they reject every
suggestion that children not choosing to attend religious instruction be
permitted to go home.
The present writer believes that the released time program contains
within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. With the steady improvement in the training of public school teachers and of educational methods, public school education is becoming increasingly attractive to children. More and more, children actually want to go to school, and
more and more they will prefer to remain in school than go to the
church for the weekly hour of religious instruction. When religious
education likewise improves in teaching personnel and practice so that
it becomes so attracti~e as to constitute a real competitor of public school
education, it will be found that encroachment upon public school time
will not be necessary and that children will be willing to visit the church
school for religious instruction after public school hours. 34 Then religious education will be truly voluntary, and the religious liberty issue
truly absent.
34 There is substantial evidence that religious educators are becoming increasingly
aware of this, and that adoption of modem teaching methods, improved training and
standards of teachers and better school facilities have effected substantial increases in
attendance at religious schools without recourse to the released time plan. See, e.g., Pilch,
"The Status of Jewish Education,'' 21 CoNGREss WEEKLY, No. 12, p. 1 (March 22, 1954).

